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ABSTRACT 
 
There has been much speculation about whether the National Institute for Health Clinical 
Excellence (NICE) has, or ought to have, a ‘threshold’ figure for the cost of an additional 
quality-adjusted life-year (QALY) above which a technology will not be recommended 
for use in the National Health Service (NHS).   This paper argues that it is not 
constitutionally appropriate for NICE to set such a threshold, which is properly the 
business of parliament.  Instead, the task for NICE is as a ‘threshold-searcher’ -- to seek 
to identify an optimal threshold incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), at the ruling 
rate of expenditure, that is consistent with the aim of the health service to maximize 
population health.  This will involve the identification of technologies currently made 
available on the NHS that have estimated ICERs above the ratio, and alternative uses for 
those resources in the shape of technologies not currently provided that fall below the 
threshold.  
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Introduction 
 
The Quality-Adjusted Life-Year (QALY) is the outcome measure of choice for the 
National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE) [1 p. 48].  There has been 
much speculation about whether NICE has a ‘threshold’ figure for the cost of an 
additional quality-adjusted life-year above which a technology will not be recommended 
for use in the National Health Service (NHS), and there has been some suggestion that 
NICE is dissembling in its denials that such a threshold exists [2 p. 27]. An early 
retrospective analysis of appraisal determinations in its first year of operation, 
summarised by Sir Michael Rawlins at NICE’s annual public meeting in 2001, suggested 
that positive recommendations were in general associated with a cost per QALY of 
£30,000 or less; higher cost per QALY figures would receive approval only if there were 
special factors accepted as relevant by the Appraisal Committee (and the NICE Board) 
and not covered by the formal modelling [3 para 11].  
 
Attempts to infer what any such threshold might be, based on published appraisal 
decisions, have identified a general concentration of estimates in the region of £20,000 - 
£30,000 in one study [2] and a suggestion that  the threshold might be considerably 
higher than £30,000 in another [3].  In April 2004, the Institute confirmed that 
interventions with a cost per QALY below £20,000 were likely to be recommended; 
whilst the acceptability of therapies between £20,000 and £30,000 per QALY is more 
likely to depend upon other factors, such as the innovative nature of the therapy [1, page 
33].  Prior to this, the only published specific threshold comes from the Department of 
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Health [4, para 12] in which a threshold of £36,000 was set, specific to a risk sharing 
agreement with the pharmaceutical industry over the provision of disease modifying 
drugs for people living with multiple sclerosis.   
 
In this paper, we argue that there are good reasons why it is improper for NICE to apply a 
specific threshold.  Rather, we characterise NICE’s proper function as a “threshold 
searcher”, seeking to identify the optimal threshold that lies somewhere between the least 
cost-effective technology currently provided and the most cost-effective technology not 
yet available routinely in the NHS. 
 
 
It is not constitutionally proper for NICE to determine the threshold 
NICE’s function in relation to appraisals, as set out in the Framework Document issued 
by the Secretary of State for Health and the National Assembly for Wales, is 
 “to appraise the clinical benefits and the costs of such health care 
interventions as may be notified by the Secretary of State or the National 
Assembly for Wales … and to reach a judgement on whether on balance this 
intervention can be recommended as a cost-effective use of NHS and PSS 
resources” [5 p.28].  
 
NICE does not, of course, set the NHS budget and, to our knowledge, no one has 
suggested that it would in any way be proper for it to do so. Parliament sets the NHS’s 
budget and thus the ultimate financial constraint on the NHS. 
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The logical implications of NICE’s mandate can be made clear in the following way. 
Consider a rank ordering of all the technologies available to the NHS and the most 
efficient ways of spending NHS funding as shown in Figure 1.  Those that have the 
largest possible impact on health per pound spent are plotted on the left with each 
addition to health gain falling as those with the best chances of being helped have already 
been helped. The downward slope depicted in Figure 1 continues until the point E is 
reached in Figure 1, at which the available NHS budget has been used up.  The height of 
the line at this point (Ea) shows the marginal health gain from additional expenditure 
(mhg), given the current budget. Its inverse shows the marginal cost-effectiveness of 
NHS expenditure, or the  threshold incremental cost-effectiveness ratio. The total health 
gain produced by this expenditure is the entire area under the curve. It is the greatest gain 
in health achievable, given the range of technologies available and the current NHS 
budget.  It requires that this budget is effectively spent by the NHS so that none of the 
technologies with an mhg less than Ea are used.  
 
If the objective is indeed to maximize the impact of health services on health then one 
can approach the defining characteristic of this objective in either one of two ways. One 
can speak either of a budget that is to be efficiently spent, which entails using all the 
technologies embodied in the figure up to 0E, which implies the threshold mhg of Ea; or 
one can speak of a threshold QALY gain per unit of expenditure - Ea, which entails using 
all technologies whose mhg is higher than Ea, which will (just) require a budget of 0E. 
The two are equivalent: one may either spend the budget to maximise health (which 
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implies the threshold), or purchase all technologies up to the threshold (which implies the 
budget). Both produce exactly the same outcome – and NICE is constitutionally qualified 
to determine neither of them!  
 
Determining the budget is Parliament’s business. NICE is neither mandated nor qualified 
to make judgments about the relative value of public money spent on health care versus 
the other possibilities – education, defence, environment, etc. and, of course, private 
consumption. But, since determining the threshold is logically equivalent to determining 
the budget (given the available technologies embodied in the curve), then NICE cannot 
be qualified to pronounce on that either. 
 
Therefore, information about how much an individual or society values improvements in 
health outcome (i.e. their willingness to pay for a QALY) is not at all relevant to the 
NICE remit.  These values could only be used as the appropriate threshold by NICE if it 
were also given responsibility to set the NHS budget. However, NICE has commissioned 
independent research into the social value of QALY [6].  Whilst this information may 
have a bearing on political judgments concerning the level of resources the NHS ought to 
receive, it is unlikely to correspond to the threshold required to maximize health gain 
from a budget constraint given by Parliament. 
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NICE as a threshold-searcher 
The information demands of optimizing NHS expenditure are manifestly huge. NICE has 
incomplete and uncertain information on the mhg function in figure 1 and, therefore, does 
not know the value of the threshold.  The threshold is neither taken by NICE (from 
government) nor made by NICE.  NICE is neither a threshold taker nor a threshold 
maker.  NICE is, in effect, a threshold-searcher, where the threshold is logically implied 
by the combination of the technologies that are available and the budget, but is not 
readily visible.  
 
Figure 1 assumes the NHS is able to allocate its budget on programmes in order of their 
health gain per pound spent.  Figure 2 explores the more realistic analytical problem for 
NICE when the current budget is not allocated in this efficient manner . In Figure 2, the 
range of technologies in 0E embodies those extant in the NHS. Let us assume that all are 
positive and that the least productive one has, as before, a mhg of Ea. However, we now 
assume that there are many technologies either extant or emergent that are not currently 
provided within the NHS. These technologies are ranked in a separate downward-sloping 
function to the right of E labeled cf. A composite mhg curve is the horizontal sum of the 
two lines, Hde. which combines all available technologies: those in use as well as those 
that could be used but are not, and again orders them by contribution to health gain. It is 
immediately apparent that NICE confronts three potentially interesting marginal health 
gains, the size of none of which it can be sure. Ea is the actual mhg implied by current 
use in the NHS. It is what the current ‘threshold’ would appear to be if a comprehensive 
assessment were to be made of the ways in which current NHS resource are used. Ec is 
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the health gain to be achieved from adopting the best technology not currently in use in 
the NHS. Eb is the threshold above which technologies ought to be adopted and below 
which they ought not.  
 
The incorporation of any technology not in current use with a mhg above  Eb would 
represent an increase in health outcomes as long as it displaces a technology with a lower 
mgh (in the range E’E).  The optimal solution is plainly to cease using all those 
technologies in the range E’E on Ha and substitute for them all those in the range EE” (= 
E’E) on cf. The search strategy for NICE is to work within the “zone of substitution” 
defined by E’E”, identifying technologies in current use that are the least productive uses 
of current NHS resources, and identifying better value technologies that are not currently 
provided. 
 
NICE’s search strategies 
 
It is not feasible for NICE to examine the cost-effectiveness of all interventions to reveal 
the location of Hde.  Instead, NICE adopts a number of strategies consistent with the 
behaviour to be expected of a threshold searcher. In collaboration with the Department of 
Health, it engages in horizon scanning to explore technologies that probably lie in the 
zone of substitution.   NICE also relies upon a broad consultation process with all 
stakeholders, including the general public, to identify technologies for both investment 
and disinvestment. [7]   The proposals obtained through the consultation process are 
reviewed by two expert committees; the Advisory Committee on Topic Selection (ACTS) 
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and the Joint Planning Group, [7]  who bring their broad knowledge of the efficiency of a 
wide range of NHS interventions to the consideration of which therapies to put forward 
for review.  Within the review process the 
“appraisal committee’s judgments on the cost effectiveness of a new 
technology must include judgments on the implications for health care 
programmes for other patient groups…how the cost effectiveness of the 
technology being appraised relates to other intereventions/technologies 
currently being applied in the NHS.” 
 
If this system were to work well, we would expect to see a mixture of investment and 
disinvestment opportunities being reviewed by NICE. However, in practice almost all 
NICE appraisals have considered opportunities for investment. [8] As a result, 
disinvestment opportunities have had to be considered at local provider level.  Whilst some 
local commissioners have established formal processes for considering local disinvestment 
and investment decisions [9], [10], [11], there is evidence of substantial variation in both 
the quality and the degree of transparency in local health commissioning processes [12].  
Methods for identifying and evaluating local investment and disinvestment opportunities 
do exist; for example Programme Budgeting and Marginal Analysis, (PBMA). [13]. 
However, the widespread adoption of  a common evaluative framework, producing 
information on the cost effectiveness of a much larger range of NHS interventions may 
help to provide a bridge between local commissioning processes and NICE.  For example, 
NICE could be asked to work with local commissioners to identify programmes and 
technologies for which there exists a prima facie case for disinvestment.  It could then 
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appraise these over time together with emerging technologies, in the expectation of 
imposing a more balanced set of investment and disinvestment requirements on local 
decision-makers  
 
Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we have argued that it is not NICE’s constitutional role to determine the 
value of an additional QALY since the setting of the NHS budget is properly a matter for 
parliament. NICE nonetheless needs a criterion on which to judge the cost-effectiveness 
of technologies that pass through its appraisal process and it is the search for the 
threshold implied by the prevailing NHS budget that is the appropriate task for NICE.  
This will require NICE to grasp the disinvestment nettle and include within its current 
appraisal process technologies that should no longer be provided by the NHS as well as 
candidate technologies to replace them. 
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